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During recent decades social theory has struggled with the attempt to
overcome both subjectivist and structuralist conceptions. In this effort,
actors have been understood to construct social reality through their
practices. Thus, social practices are socially constructed at the same time.
Neither subjects nor objects existed prior to this work of construction; the
nature of reality is therefore always symbolic, discursive.' These ideas
have been accorded a warm reception in the Law and Society (L&S)
Movement, and, in particular, in a current of thought within the movement
that is interested in the study of legal consciousness in the everyday life of
social actors, here termed "Legal Consciousness Studies" (LCS). In this
Essay, I propose to analyze some aspects of the reception of that social
theory in these sociolegal studies. The hypothesis that I want to
demonstrate is that despite the importance of their contributions to
understanding of law, there is a theoretical ambiguity in these studies. This
follows from the fact that they adhere to different currents of social theory,
which are irreconcilable to the extent that they are premised on different
presuppositions about social relations.2
* Garcia-Villegas is a Professor of Law at the National University in Bogota,
Colombia, and an Affiliated Scholar at the Institute of Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin
Law School.
** A similar but different version of this Essay is being published in a special issue of
the InternationalJournalforthe Semiotics of Law edited by John Brigham.
*** I would like to thank Jane Larson, John Brigham, Sally Merry, Cesar Rodriguez,
Diego L6pez, Howard Erlanger, Catherine Albiston, Daniel Lipson, Christine Ruggiero, Ruben
Garcia, Oscar Guardiola, Jonathan Graubart, Dan Steard, and Austin Sarat, for the valuable
comments they provided on an earlier version of this Essay.
1. For this concept, see ERNESTO LACLAU &CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST
STRATEoY: TOwARD A RADICAL DEMOCRATIc POLITICS (1985).
2.

See generally JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, TWENTY LECTuREs: SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

SINCE WORLD WAR 11 (1987).
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To illustrate this ambiguity, I will contrast the way that the concept of
symbolic efficacy is employed in the LCS and in the work of Pierre
Bourdieu, who is frequently cited by the new sociolegal studies as an
authorized theoretical reference. I will analyze, first, some basic concepts
that underpin the sociolegal studies considered here; then I turn to an
explication of some notions related to the idea of symbolism in law; finally
I concentrate on a theoretical comparison between Bourdieu and the LCS.
My hope is to contribute to the French debate on both Bourdieu's
sociolegal theory and the sociology of law in general.
I. LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES

At the end of the 1980s some prominent members of L&S began to

reconceptualize its movement. The aim was to achieve greater critical
commitment in opposition to the predominant position, which, according
to critics, was politically and epistemologically perverted through the
prevalence of an institutional viewpoint and a public policy bias? This
redirection revived the old realist purpose to attain an empirical sociology
of law that was, at the same time, critical. The studies encompassed in this
project of renewal can be termed, following McCann and March,4 and
Ewick and Silbey,5 "Legal Consciousness Studies." They include not only
those authors referred to in McCann and March,6 but also part of the group
of sociolegal researchers-especially what Trubek and Esser have named
the "Cultural Anthropology" tendency-partially linked to the Amherst
Seminar in Massachusetts. All of these authors base their work in a
constitutive theory of social action and beginning from that point, attack
3. See generally Austin Sarat & Susan S. Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 LAw

& POL'Y 97 (1988).
4. See generally Michael W. McCann & Tracey March, Law and Everyday Forms of
Resistance: A Socio-PoliticalAssessment, in 15 STUDIES INLAW, POLITICS, & SOCIETY (Austin

Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1995).
5.See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW:
STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE ch. 3 (1998) [hereinafter COMMON PLACE]; Patricia Ewick & Susan
S. Silbey, Conformity, ContestationandResistance: An Account ofLegal Consciousness,26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992) [hereinafter Legal Consciousness].
6. McCann & March, supra note 4, at 208-09. In their examination of these sociolegal
studies McCann and March concentrate on the following authors: SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETING
JUSTICE AND GEITING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING CLASS AMERICANS (1990);
BARBARA YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CITIZENS, DISRUPTIVE SUBJEcrS: ORDER AND COMPLAINT INA
NEW ENGLAND COURT (1993); Legal Consciousness,supranote 5; Austin Sarat, "...
The Law Is

All Over": Power, Resistance and Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 343 (1990) [hereinafter The Law]; Austin Sarat, Offto Meet the Wizard: Beyond Validity
and Reliability in the Searchfor a Post-EmpiricistSociology of Law, 15 LAW &SOC. INQUIRY 155
(1990) [hereinafter Off to Meet the Wizard]; Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival

Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. I (1990). See
generally McCann & March, supra note 4.
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instrumentalist visions of law. 7 In this sense they are not too dissimilar
from the Critical Legal Theorists, although LCS distanced itself from these
theorists in its vindication of empirical investigation.
I will develop my analysis on these LCS mostly in very general terms,
understanding that they belong to what is today a dominant trend in
sociolegal studies in the United States. I am aware of the fact that, given
this level of abstraction, my critique is not suitable to all authors interested
in legal consciousness.
The legal phenomenon is seen in LCS as a constitutive element of
social reality and not as an official institutional apparatus destined to
intervene in this reality! Accordingly, the attention of the investigator is
directed toward those everyday concrete social practices in which legal
rules are perceived as constitutive elements of the reality. This emphasis
on the routine instead of the exceptional, on the social in place of the
institutional, and on mental representations (the symbolic worldview)
instead of a coercive legal system (the instrumental vision) are common
elements in this change of optic.9
The concept of legality is central to this perspective. Patricia Ewick and
Susan Silbey point out that "(1)egality is an emergent feature of social
relations rather than an external apparatus acting upon social life. As a
constituent of social interaction, the law-or what we will call
legality-embodies the diversity of the situations out of which it emerges
and that it helps structure."1 One can detect three more or less scattered
premises in this reconfiguring of L&S: first, a defense of empirical
research without implying the adoption of positivist postulates; second, a
progressive political position in favor of weak or marginalized social
actors; and finally, a perspective that is more open to exploring the
complexities of the relationship between law and social change from a
constructivist perspective.
In the first place, LCS was opposed to the crude positivism of the early
years of the L&S Movement." There is no objective truth; that is, there is
no truth independent of the knowing subject. The significance of
knowledge is socially constructed in the relationship between the observer
7. It is worth noticing that there are some legal theorists who apply the constitutive theory
to the legal field in rather different terms. See, e.g., JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CONSTITUTION OF
INTERESTS: BEYOND THE POLmCs OF RIGHTS (1996); John Brigham, The Constitution ofInterests:
Institutionalism, CLS and New Approaches to SociolegalStudies, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 421
(1998) [hereinafter Constitutions of Interests].
8. According to Ewick and Silbey, "The ways in which the law is experienced and
understood by ordinary citizens as they choose to invoke the law, to avoid it, or to resist it, is an
essential part of the life of the law." Legal Consciousness,supra note 5, at 737.
9. Id. at 741-42.
10. COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 17.
1I. McCann & March, supra note 4.
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and the observed. 2 However, this proposition has provoked great debate

in the North American sociology of law, particularly centered around the
Amherst Seminar. Betweeen 1980 and 1995 Amherst, Masschusetts, was
home of a discussion group in sociolegal theory called the "Amherest
Seminar on Legal Ideology and Legal Process." For over a decade, the
most important intellectuals in North American and European sociology
of law were invited to the seminar. There was some affinity between the
seminar and the LCS. The seminar's aim was to reconstruct an empirical
sociology that was at the same time critical.' 3 Sociolegal research provides
new visions or interpretations of legal phenomena, perhaps more adequate,
but without validity or truth being claimed for them.'4 Empirical
investigation and the research methodology of the social sciences are not
sacrificed-and in this regard the empiricist imperative maintains all the
vigor of the L&S tradition-although the objectivist postulates typical of
positivistic social science are renounced. So, its advocates champion a
postempiricism that does not conceive of science as authoritative or
conclusive knowledge, but one that "continues to keep alive the hope that
science can serve as a tool of persuasion, albeit a limited one, in a world
with 'a multitude of values, knowledge perspectives, and criteria.""'
Empirical research thus changes its subject of analysis in this new
version of L&S. LCS react against a research tradition dedicated to the
study of how legal institutions operate, and, in particular, the courts. LCS
also interested themselves in judicial work, but not from the perspective
of the judge or the judge's decision, as the earlier work in L&S had done.
Instead, they examine judicial work from the perspective of the
participating actors. In McCann's words, they countered the top-down
' In these new micro-cultural
approach with "bottom-up jurisprudence."6
spaces, ethnographic and anthropological research acquire an
overwhelming importance that contrast with other approaches that are
more concerned with the structural elements of class or hegemony.

12. See Christine B. Harrington & Barbara Yngvesson, Interpretative Sociolegal Research,
15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 135, 148 (1990).
13. David M. Trubek & John Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies:
Paradox, Program, or Pandora'sBox?, 14 LAW&Soc. INQUIRY 3, 3-52 (1987). In theirevaluation
of the seminar's achievements Trubek and Esser state that although the seminar pariticpants were
able to leave behind a deterministic and instrumentalist view of legality, the attachment to a
conception of empirical science was unchanging, and that created important theoretical problems.
For the complete debate, see generally Review Section Debate, 15 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 135, 13580(1990).
14. See Off to Meet the Wizard, supra note 6, at 166.
15. Id. at 165.
16. MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION 21 (1994).
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Additionally, LCS identified themselves politically with the interests
of the subjects of their research-the marginalized, the minorities, the
excluded, etc.-and then attempted to create alternative social forms
through the use of law. 7 This Essay affirmatively resolves the debate that
arose inside the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) group about the convenience
of using the law as an instrument of social emancipation. LCS recognize
the possibilities of struggle against hegemony without forgetting that the
law can, de facto, work in some cases as an instrument of social
domination. 8 In this regard, the understanding of the relationship between
law and social change is much more complex and elaborate than the
approach found in CLS. 9
Also, from its origins, those working in LCS joined critics in rejecting
the gap studies and, in general, positioned themselves against the
instrumentalist views of law predominating in L&S during the 1970s. In
contrast to these approaches, they insisted on the indeterminate character
of law.2" Legal norms give way to multiple, disparate, and variable social
practices that can only be made sense of by investigating empirically the
legal consciousness of concrete social actors. This research shows how
social actors, despite being limited by social structures, possess a
significant creative, constructive capacity. While the notion of
determination or lack thereof in critical studies leads to the structuralistMarxist debate on the relations between the state/law and the economy, in
LCS the same theme directs emphasis toward the cultural and subjective
elements of political domination and thus to the adoption of an
"interpretive" social theory.2 Following this perspective, legal
consciousness is part of a reciprocal process in which the significance
attributed by individuals to their world, and thus to law, "become[s]
repeated, patterned, and stabilized, and those institutionalized structures
become part of the meaning systems employed by individuals."22 If
legality is a dynamic process of social construction, the instrumentalist
approach and determinate character of law lose all explanatory power. In
its place arises a concept of law endowed with contingent outcomes that
derive from the interaction of individuals and institutions.

17. KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS

(1988); see generally White, supra note 6.
18. Adelaide H. Villmoare, The Left's Problems with Rights, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 39, 41-43

(1985).
19. See MCCANN, supra note 16.

20. Legal Consciousness, supra note 5, at 742; see also COMMON PLACE, supra note 5.
21. See generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LuCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE INTHE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966).

22. Legal Consciousness, supra note 5, at 741. The cultural emphasis in these studies is
notorious. On this point, see MCCANN, supra note 16.
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II. ANTI-STRUCTURALISM AND THE CRITICAL STANCE

Studies of legal consciousness bring together, with variants, essential
parts of both the L&S and critical traditions. From L&S they have taken
the idea that empirical research is essential to make sense of the way law
functions in society. From the critical tradition they have adopted the
aspiration that sociolegal studies should serve not only to describe how
law operates in society, but also, and above all, to contribute to the
transformation of society and the defense of the excluded. In relation to
this latter aspect, as mentioned above, these studies have made extremely
important contributions, especially with regard to the complexity of
individuals' legal strategies, whether of accommodation or resistance.23
Despite their critical ambitions, however, a reading of the LCS leave, from
the political point of view, a nostalgic taste of lost revolutionary
fervor-recognizing that in this they are not alone-and, from the
theoretical standpoint, the sensation of "rigor without imagination," to use
one of Pierre Bourdieu's expressions. This despair appears to be due to the
adoption of a type of epistemological approach that neglects the role of
political domination in sociolegal phenomena. On this point Trubek and
Esser seem to be correct when, analyzing these studies, they relate LCS'
failure to provide a strong political critique to the studies attachment to
empiricism.24 According to Trubek and Esser, the Seminar was not able to
elucidate the complex relationship between knowledge and politics;
perhaps for that reason, their studies lack the political commitment and the
moral richness that is often found in critical studies and in feminist work.25
Excessive confidence in social science and in the possibility of
understanding a sociolegal reality through empirical investigation limits
their critical perspective. The fact that, according to established social
science methods, only "verifiable" objects of study are accepted minimizes
the possibilities of interpretation and critique. Over-dependence on data
derived from empiricism generally limited to local social settings means
that the critique loses the force of more comprehensive denunciations.26 I
agree with Trubek and Esser on their idea that LCS lack critical
dimension, but I take a different argument to explain why that happened.
Instead of looking at the way they adopt empiricism, I focus on a tension
or even an inconsistency in their theoretical background.

23. See generally MCCANN, supra note 16; McCann & March, supra note 4.
24. See generally Trubek & Esser, supra note 13.
25. Id. at 33-34.
26. See generally Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Roomfor Manoeuver: Paradox, Program,
or Pandora's Box?, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 149 (1989); Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest
and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & Soc'Y. REV. 697 (1992).
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The contemporary debate on empiricism and criticism, however, is not
what it was when Trubek and Esser wrote their influential essay. Over
recent decades, sociolegal theory in L&S has joined in with the prevailing
tendency in social theory, according to which it is necessary to supersede
both objectivist positions (functionalism, structuralism) and subjectivist
stances (phenomenology, ethnomethodology, interactionism, etc.) This
tendency goes by different names, among which the theoriepratique of
Pierre Bourdieu and the "structuration theory" of Anthony Giddens are
outstanding examples. In LCS, these theoretical positions are generally
recognized and adopted under the rubric of a "constitutive theory of
law.9128

Despite this theoretical "agreement" around the notion of a constitutive
theory of law-an agreement which moreover is proposed in very general
terms-the empirical research of the LCS seem to be marked, in practice,
by an underestimation of the structural elements privileging individual
action.29 In this Essay, I argue that the domestication of critique in the LCS
is linked to a certain dissonance between their empirical studies and the
theoretical grounding. This dissociation has an explanation not only in a
certain geographical division between empirical research with a strong
influence of North American empiricist traditions" and a theoretical bases

27. See, e.g., ADVANCES INSOCIAL THEORY AND METHODOLOGY: TOWARD AN INTEGRATION
OF MICRO- AND MACRO-SOCIOLOGIES (K. Knorr-Cetina & A.V. Cicourel eds., 198 1) [hereinafter
ADVANCES OF SOCIAL THEORY AND METHODOLOGY], in which articles by Anthony Giddens, Pierre

Bourdieu, J. Habermas, Randall Collins, and others are included; MICHAEL BURAWOY ET AL.,
ETHNOGRAPHY UNBOUND, POWER AND RESISTANCE INTHE MODERN METROPOLIS (199 1); Anthony
Elliot, Introduction,in THE BLACKWELL READER INCONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (Anthony
Elliot ed., 1999).
28. See JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERESTS: BEYOND THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS
(1996); COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 274; MCCANN, supra note 16, at 303; Harrington &
Yngvesson, supra note 12, at 141; Legal Consciousness,supra note 5.For a more general overview
of the contributions of this theory in law, see ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS INLAW AND SOCIETY:
TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW (1993). Legal consciousness studies (LCS) are not
alone in employing this theory, see, e.g., Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity and
Difference in Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999 (1994). For its theoretical
antecedents, see DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegalfHistories,36 STAN.
L. REV. 57 (1984); Karl Klare, Lawmaking as Praxis,40 TELOS 123 (1979). The constitutive theory
of law is usually an offshoot of cultural studies, especially drawing on the seminal work of
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
(1983) and MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE (Steven Rendall trans., 1984)
and of postmodemism; see Handler, supra note 26; LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note I.
29. Handier, supra note 26.
30. C.G.A. Bryant argues that a positivist approach to the social sciences has predominated
U.S. departments of sociology since 1940. CHRISTOPHER G.A. BRYANT, POSITIVISM INSOCIAL
THEORY RESEARCH 133 (1985); see also Alan Sica, Social Theory's "Constituency," 20 AM.
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of European origin3t emphasizing critique, but also in a differentiation
with political roots as the dissociation between theoretical model and
empirical investigation originates in the existence ofdivergent "theoretical
presuppositions"--to employ Alexander's concept-from which the
proposed theoretical models are constructed. Let me explain. One possible
division in social theory is that which differentiates between those who
study society as a terrain of conflict, stratified and marked by struggle,32
and theorists who, without ignoring the existence of conflict, posit that
society is better characterized by features such as interaction and culture.
This tension between conflict and consensus in social theory harks back
to a debate that exercised functionalist and Marxist scholars during the
1960s and which today is considered to have been superseded.33 In a more
general sense, however, this tension continues to have meaning and
manifests itself in different ways.34
In short, I hypothesize that there is a dissociation in LCS between two
types of theoretical foundations. On one hand, they seem to adhere to a
general theory primarily developed in Europe by theorists working within
a social conflict tradition.35 This framework is supposedly aimed at
nourishing what LCS call a constitutive social theory, by which the
structure/agency dichotomy would be overcome. On the other hand,
however, empirical research in LCS seems to be grounded in a typically
American social theory that we may term, following Collins,
microinteractionist. According to this approach, and in opposition to
conflict theories, elements linked to agency, like individual consciousness,
communication among actors, and symbolic interchanges, prevail. Given
the preeminence of empiricism over theoretical analysis in LCS, this
dissociation leads to a situation in which actors and their consciousness
and practices turn out to be much more important than social structures
working to restrict actors. Thus, cognitive matters became central in the
analysis, whereas political elements were almost forgotten. Symbolic
interchange obscures symbolic violence.
In other terms, there seems to be a gap between interpretivist
theoretical models-society as constructed-based in assumptions close
to the conflict tradition, and empirical investigations associated with a sort
SOCIOLOGIST 227, 227-41 (1989).
31. In theoretical matters, North American sociologists of law have been somewhat
dependent on European tendencies. See de Sousa Santos, supra note 26; Trubek & Esser, supra
note 13.
32. Here I am referring in general terms to all social theories that emphasize conflict,
especially between groups and classes, as a central element of social practices and of social theory.
33. See generally ANTHONY GiDDENs, SOCIOLOGY 1 (1993).
34. As Randall Collins reviews in his text, RANDALLCOLLNS, FouR SOCIOLOGICAL
TRADITIONS

(1994).

35. Such theorists include Bourdieu, Foucault, Giddens, and Touraine.
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of cultural microinteractionism. This dichotomy also appears as a lack of
accord between defenders of a cultural perspective on legal practices36 and
proponents of a conflict theory.37 The fact that all of these authors share
the idea to overcome the dichotomy between structure and agency-which
characterizes constitutive social theory--does not seem sufficient to
include them under a unitary model. So, the dissociation between the
theoretical and the empirical in LCS is also evidenced as a divergence with
respect to the use of interpretive social theory: while some employ the idea
of the interconnection between structure and agency to show the cognitive
importance of social construction premised on agency, others use this
supposition to illustrate how domination is originated and produced. In
short: I claim that a theory such as that of Bourdieu or Giddens confuses
more than it enlightens when it is incorporated into the theoretical model
termed "the constitutive theory of law."
This argument is worth developing in more detail. In the cultural vision
that underlies LCS the law is seen as a symbolic or discursive object.3"
This symbolic vision on law is different from the concept of the symbolic
use of law that Bourdieu, among others,39 proposes. While the first concept

36. See, e.g., GEERTZ, supra note 28; PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999); Susan Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural
Analyses of Law, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39 (1992); Barbra Yngvesson, Inventing Law in Social
Settin: Retuinking Popular Legal Culture, 98 YALE L. J. 1689 (1989).
37. See, e.g., PIERRE BOuRDiEU, RAISONS PRATIQUES: SUR LA THORIE DEL'ACTION (1994);
ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE AND
CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1979) [hereinafter CENTRAL PROBLEMS]; ANTHONY

GIDDENS, SOCIOLOGY [hereinafter SOCIOLOGY]. Bourdieu explains the production and reproduction
of hierarchical social systems with reference to the way that cultural resources, social processes,
and institutions maintain individuals in a continual competition for social dominance. On the
adoption of a social theory of conflict in Bourdieu, see DAVID SWARTZ, CULTURE AND POWER: THE
SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU (1997). Giddens, in turn, argues that all social systems
can be studied as incorporating or expressing modes of domination and it is this
concept more than any other that provides the focal point for the investigation of
power. Social systems that have some regularized existence across time-space are
always "power systems," or exhibit forms of domination, in the sense that they are
comprised of relations of autonomy and dependence between actors or
collectivities of actors.
ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE 8 (1987).
38. The sociolegal literature alludes to this as "interpretive." Trubek & Esser, supra note 13,
at 13-14. In Europe the term "discursive" is more frequently used.
39. See generally GEORGES BALANDIER, LE POUVOIR SUR SCtNES (Ballard ed., 1992); Jost
EDUARDO FARIA, EFICACIA JURIDICA E VIOLENCIA SIMBOLICA: 0 DIREITO COMO INSTRUMENTO DE
TRANSFORMACAO SOCIAL (1984); Danidle Loschak, Droit, normaliti et normalization, in LE DROIT
EN PROCESS (Danidle Loschak ed., (1983); MAURICIO GARCIA-VILLEGAS, LA EFICACA SIMBOLICA
DEL DERECHO: EXAMEN DE SITUACIONES COLOMBIANAS (1993).
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refers chiefly to a problem of knowledge,4' the second adds an element of
social domination.4 Given the plurality and malleability of the legal
symbols in the conception of LCS, and given that the meaning of such
symbols is never fixed, law has a social character that is essentially weak
and almost random.42 Sarat, for instance, claims43 that disadvantaged
citizens do not accept a "myth of rights";" individuals in his stories seem
able to resist legal symbols. This clearly contrasts with its strong and
almost inevitable character, in social and political terms, in the work of
Bourdieu and other authors who refer to the symbolic use of law as a
political phenomenon working in a hierarchical society.
Let me put this in other terms: a constructive or interpretive vision of
society entails that the explanation of society is reduced to the relation
between agency and structure or between subjects and objects. The social
reality is therefore constructed, relational, discursive, and cultural-pure
elements outside this relation. If this is the case, the problem here is how
to understand law as a discursive or cultural devise. What is the symbolic
efficacy of law in a social setting? And it is precisely in relation to these
problems that LCS and Bourdieu advance different conceptions of the law
as legal practice.
I will develop these ideas as follows: first, I will undertake a succinct

explication of the concepts of the symbolism in legal scholarship, and I
will show its different uses in North America; then I will illustrate how the

concept of symbolic uses of law is developed in Bourdieu as contrasted to
the concept of symbolic vision in LCS.
Ill.

THE CONCEPTS OF SYMBOLISM IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Symbolism is not a way to manufacture meanings, but is rather a
modality of textual interpretation.45 It entails not only a presumption of
analogy between symbols and objects, but also a fundamental uncertainty
in meaning structures. The symbolic relies mainly on what Umberto Eco
40. See CLIFFORD GEERTz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 21 (1983) (refering to this perspective as "conceiving of social life as organized
in terms of symbols... whose meaning... we must grasp if we are to understand that organization
and formulate its principles").
41. This difference, as we will see below, is not at all clear in the treatment that has been
accorded to the symbolic in North American sociology of law. In other words, clarity does not exist
concerning the meaning and scope of law understood as a symbol that constitutes and is constituted
in these practices.
42. MERRY, supra note 6, at 147.
43. E.g., The Law, supra note 6, at 374.
44. See generally STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974).
45. UMBERTO ECO, SEMIOTICAEFILOSOFIA DEL LINGUAGGIO 225 (1984); ROLAND BARTHES,

MITOLOGIAS 211,214,226 (1980).
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calls the "cloudiness of the content." 46 In contrast, metaphors function
precisely in terms of meaning. Metaphors "allow us to understand one
domain of experience in terms of another." 7 Thus, symbolism involves
interpretation and justification in pragmatic contexts. This is called
pragmatic understanding of language 8 and has had an extraordinary
influence on twentieth century theory. It is associated with the elimination
of the subject/object dichotomy in social theory,49 with the prevalence of
hermeneutic approaches both in the social sciences50 and law,5 with
rhetorical approaches in legal theory,52 with the analysis of symbols and
anthropology," and with the study of sociolegal
symbolism 5 in
4
interactions.
In terms of social action, the symbolic is contrasted with the
instrumental. The transformation of social reality through pragmatic
measures characterizes instrumental action, whereas actions oriented to the
production of meaning in the context of communication and interpretation
characterize symbolic actions. Here, as Gusfield has noted, "the goal is
reached in the behavior itself rather than in any state which it brings
46. ECO, supra note 45, at 226; see also ROLAND BARTHES, MITOLOGIAs 211, 214, 226
(1980).
47. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 117 (1980).
48. Regarding the distinction between semantics, syntax, and the pragmatic, see Charles W.
Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED
SCIENCE (Otto Neurath ed., 1938). For the pragmatic uses of language, see H.P. Grice, Meaning,
64 PHILOSOPHICALREV. 337,377-88 (1957). For the relationship between linguistic pragmatics and
power, see BOURDIEU, supra note 37; V.N. VOLOSINOV, MARXISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE (1973).
49. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LE SENS PRATIQUE 43 (1980) ("Among all oppositions artificially
dividing social science the most unfortunate and ruinous is that established between subject[ ] and
object[ ]."); SOCIOLOGY, supranote 37, at 158 (noting that the study of natural languages is central
both to the understanding of actions as "meaningful," and to the process of communication in social
interactions); JEAN-FRAN(iOIS LYOTARD, LA CONDITION POSTMODERN 67 (1979) ("le lien social
est langagier").
50. SOCIOLOGY, supra note 37, at 149.
5 1. See RONALD DwORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 28
(explaining judicial work as neither a discretionary nor mechanical activity); see also Gordon,
supra note 28.
52. The pragmatic relations between the speaker and audience in the context of legal
argumentation have been explored extensively by CHAIM PERELMAN, LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE (1979);
CHAIM PERELMAN, LE RAISONNABLE ET LE DtRAISONNABLE EN DROIT (1984).
53. Classical works include: CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, ANTROPOLOGIA STRUcruRAL (1984);
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, TEORIA SCIENTIFICA DELLA CULTURA ED ALTRI SAGGI (1949); M.
MAUSS, TEORIA GENEEERALE DELLA MAGIA ED ALTRI SAGI (1965).
54. For example, "symbolic interactionism" has been applied to law in different ways. For
examples of the various approaches, see JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS
POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963); Thomas Meisenhelder, Law as
Symbolic Action: Kenneth Burke'sSociology ofLaw, 4 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 43, 43 -57 (198 1);
Carolyn R. Miller, Public Knowledge in Science andSociety, 3 PREdTExT 31, 31-49 (1982).
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about."" This distinction is similar to the difference between denotative
and connotative discourses: in denotation the focus is on a referent, which
is the same for everyone who refers to it; connotative references, by
contrast, are inherently ambiguous."
In legal scholarship, the idea ofthe symbolic is most widespread in the
area of constitutional law,57 but it also has been developed in criminal
law,"S labor law,59 and in environmental law.' Sociolegal scholars have
developed different approaches to the symbolic. The significance of this
concept varies widely depending on which era or which "school" one
looks at; the meaning given to it can even vary with the same author at
different times. At least four different approaches can be distinguished.
The first approach views the symbolic in terms of the inherentforce of
legal discourse.In this schema, the law is the authorized language of the
State through which its legitimacy is produced and reproduced. No state
is able to survive through the use of physical coercion alone. An
authorized jhstification for the use of physical constraints is first needed,
and law exists to furnish it. Legitimated power and the law exist in a state
of symbiosis: state actions are justified through legal norms and legal
norms are effective when they are backed by the state power. Some
sociolegal scholars also emphasize this difference. Dani61e Loschak argues
that the force of law does not reside exclusively in its recourse to
authorized physical violence, but also in the fact that it authorizes certain
speech acts-and not others-as "true" and "legitimate." 1 In the United
States, Sally Merry, for example, has argued that "law works in the world
not just by imposition of rules and punishments but also by its capacity to

55. GUSFIELD, supra note 54, at 21.
56. Id. at 170.
57. In the United States there is a large bibliography on the symbolic effects of constitutions;
see, e.g., JOHN BRIOHAM, THE CULT OF THE COURT (1987); SCHEINGOLD, supra note 44;
Constitutions ofInterest, supra note 7; Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE
L.J. 1290 (1937). For the Latin American context, see MARCELONEVES, A CONSTITUIONALIZACAO
SIMBOLICA (1994); GARCIA-VILLEGAS, supra note 39.
58. Ronald J.Berger et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 LAW & SOC'Y

REV. 329, 329-353 (1988), for example, emphasizes the symbolic dimensions of rape law as an
indicator of women's contemporary legal status, rather than as an instrumental mechanism for the
achievement of specific policy goals. Juvenile law is also frequently analyzed in symbolic terms.
59. William J. Moore & Robert J. Newman, The Effects of Right-to-Work Laws: A Review

ofthe Literature, 38 INDus. &LAB. REL. REV. 571,571-585 (1985). Moore &Newman have argued
that the impact of the right-to-work (RTW) laws on union membership, wages, and industry
location is more symbolic than substantive. See id.
60. Pauline Lane, Ecofeminism Meets Criminology, 2 THEORETiCALCRMINOLOGY 235,23548 (1998); Pierre Lascoumes, La Formalisation Juridique du Risque Industriel en Matire de
Protectionde L environment, 31 SOCIOLOGIE-DU-TRAVAIL 315, 315-33 (1989).
61. DanitleLoschak, Driot,Normalite EtNormalization,in LEDROITENPROCESS 54(1983).
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construct authoritative images of social relationships and actions.... 62
This particular property of law may be called symbolic to the extent that
it does not operate through instrumentalities, at least in the first instance,
but rather through political meaning. Political science,63 constitutional
legal studies,"M and even legal theory 6' frequently employ this
understanding of the symbolic use of law.
A second approach focuses on the process of implementation of norms
as a matter of public policy. It defines its unit of analysis in terms of an
efficacious legal system created and supported by public agencies. The
crucial distinction between law-in-action and law-in-books became for
many sociolegal scholars a rationale in the search for institutional
consistency between both elements, instead of a mechanism for critical
analysis. Marginality, contradiction, and indeterminacy, as observed
features of the law, are here converted into problems of legal
implementation.66 These "inconsistencies" are seen as problems of
administration and public adjustment, rather than, for example,
mechanisms for the production of political hegemony. From this
perspective, the distinction between the symbolic and instrumental effects
of law is collapsed into the problem of "dysfunctional law," which policymakers, aided by sociolegal knowledge, were supposed to solve. The
strong link in the early 1970s between academic researchers and state
62. MERRY, supra note 6, at 9.

63. Political science approaches often examine the processes by which government actions
shape public beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors. See, e.g., MURRAY EDELMAN, POLITICAL
LANGUAGE: WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLICIES THAT FAIL (1977); MURRAY EDELMAN, THE
SYMBOLIC USESOF POLITICS (1964) [hereinafter SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS]; Kitty Calavita, The

New Politics oflmmigration: "Balanced-Budget Conservatism" and the Symbolism ofProposition
187, 43 SOC. PROBS. 284, 284-305 (1996).

64. The symbolic dimension of a constitution is often seen as an important and necessary
political effect which conditions the constitution's instrumental efficacy. On this view, constitutions
have the symbolic function of framing a civic identity for people. See Giorgio Rebuffa, Legality
and Illegality, in the Constitution; Legalita e illegalita nella Consituzione, 37 QUADERNI-DISOCIOLOGIA 97, 97-104 (1993).
65. Even the instrumental efficacy of law presupposes this symbolic efficacy. Moreover, the

idea of validity in legal theory is very often linked to the symbolic acceptance of the legal system.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).

66. In the U.S., this process of conversion is frequently found in policy analyses. See, e.g.,
JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: How GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN
WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND; OR, WHY IT'S AMAZING THAT FEDERAL PROGRAMS
WORK AT ALL, THIS BEING A SAGA OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AS TOLD

BY TWO SYMPATHETIC OBVSERVERS WHO SEEK TO BUILD MORALS ON A FOUNDATION OF RUINED

HOPES (1973). For an example of it in the European context, see Simon Charbonneau & Jean G.
Padioleau, La Mise En Oeuvre d'une PolitiquePubliqueRdglementaire Ddfrichement Des Bois et
For&s, 21 REVUE FR. DE SOCIOLOGIE 49, 49-75 (1980); J.D. Dellay & L. Mader, Quefaire des
objectifs dans une itude de mise en oeuvre de la ligislation?,7 REVUE SUISSE DE SOCIOLOGIE 385,
385-97 (1981).
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policy reformers67 led these studies to overestimate the identification of the
state and official law. The relatively progressive political agenda that was
born with the L&S Movement was eventually smothered by the weight of
its debt to state policy reform. 8 "[T]he alliance between sociolegal
scholarship and policy elites of the liberal state," Sarat and Silbey argue,
"is sufficiently strong and subtle that research apparently critical ofaspects
to reinforce
of American legal institutions works, paradoxically,
'69
fundamental assumptions of liberal legalism.
According to a third point of view, the influence or social efficacy of
law should be sought more in the institutional creation of a reified legal
consciousness whereby social reality appears as something natural, not
constructed" and not so much in the instrumental determination of social
behaviors through rewards and sanctions. This position has been argued
by scholars in the traditional CLS. Their lack of agreement with respect to
the balance between the cultural and the economic, however, affects the
clarity of the movement when it comes to the concept of the symbolic use
of law.
Let me explain this idea. The rejection of legal instrumentalism is not
sufficient to unify the critics. This is because in the 1970s Neo-Marxist
debate on the possible autonomy of the state with respect to the economy,
an unavoidable tension was latent between the cultural dimension of
political legitimation and the structural character of the economy. 7 This
tension has divided the critics. Some adhered to the position of Poulantzas
that state autonomy--and that of law-is only relative and that therefore
the legal order is determined "in the last instance" by the structure of the
capitalist mode of production. According to this-present in Balbus for
example-the possibilities of social emancipation through progressive
juridical reforms are practically nonexistent. Others, however, relying on
a Marxist analysis with a cultural emphasis,' argued that the law offers
social movements genuine maneuverability derived from the needs that the

67. David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life ofthe Law and Society
Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 4 (1990), has also pointed to the importance of funding to this
uneasy alliance: "[s]ince there was no agency ready to provide adequate financial support for an
autonomous 'discipline' of law and society, their product was often tailored to meet the needs of
government agencies and foundations which had policy goals that might be served by law and
society knowledge." Id. at 29.
68. See id. at 28-30.
69. Sarat & Silbey, supra note 3, at 113.
70. Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories on Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROORFSsIVE CRITIQUE 281 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998)
71. See CLYDE W. BARROW, CRITICAL THEORIES OF THE STATE: MARXIST, NEO-MARXIST,

POST-MARXIST (1993).
72. Alan Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the
Concept of Ideology to the Analysis ofLaw, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REv. I(1985).
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state apparatus has to make concessions in order to maintain or increase
its legitimacy. While the first position emphasized the determining
character of the economic structure, the second highlighted the state's need
for legitimation. In this respect, James Boyle argues that when this debate
began, economic structuralism was dominant, but by the end the subjective
dimension predominated.73

The majority of the critical theorists consider that the symbolic effects
of law operate only to the benefit of state institutions and their aims of
political manipulation.74 However, too much emphasis on the unitary
character of state domination led these CLS scholars to a rather simplistic
image of law as an institutional mechanism for social control. The strength
of state legal domination undermines the possibility-even if often
remote--of emancipation from hegemonic structures through progressive
norms that were supposed to have only symbolic effects.7" Others,
however, more disposed to accept a certain cultural autonomy in the
symbolic use of law, consider that while a considerable institutional
advantage may exist relative to the possibilities of appropriation and
political manipulation of legal meanings, social movements and
individuals also can use these meanings in their favor. The concept of
hegemony in Gramsci, understood as an arena of struggle for political
meaning, is important for the defense of this position.76
In fact, it is not only the critical theorists who hold this idea of the
symbolic use of law as a practice of legitimation and domination.
Organizational theory both in Europe and in the United States has shown
how institutions respond to social problems in such a way that the aim of
legitimation and communication predominates over the achievement ofthe
proposed objectives.' Of course there is a clear rapprochement between
this position and the first one outlined above. The difference lies in
emphasis: organizational theory insists that institutional legitimation is a
73. See James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social
Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 779(1985).
74. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1392-93 (1984). See generally
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 70; Joan Roelofs, JudicialActivism
as Social Engineering: A Marxist Interpretation of the Warren Court, in SUPREME COURT
ACTIVIsM AND RESTRAINT (Stephen C. Halper & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982); Duncan Kennedy,
American Constitutionalismas Civil Religion:Notes ofan Athiest 19 NOVA L. REV. 909 (1995).
75. See generallyMarc Galanter, The RadiatingEffect ofCourts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIESOF
COURTS (Keith 0. Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983); MCCANN, supra note 16, at 218.
76. See generally Gordon, supra note 70.
77. On this point, see M. CROZIER& FRIEDBERG, L'ACTEURETLESYSTtME (l 977) in Europe,
and, in the United States, see the authors of the school called "new institutionalism" in sociology:
P. DIMAGGIO & WALTER POWELL, THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

8, 112 (1991). A similar perspective from outside this current can be found in, THE SYMBOLIC USES
OF POLITICS, supra note 63,where social problems are constructed by institutions in accordance
with their need for legitimation.
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strategy, while in the perspective that understands the symbolic as an
inherent element of law, legitimation is rather an outcome.
A fourth approach to the symbolic use of law can be found in studies
emphasizing the cultural aspect of ordinary citizens' legal consciousness;
the law is viewed here as a social practice which "operates... as both an
interpretive framework and a set of resources with which and through
which the social world (including that part known as the law) is
constituted."" "Law," argues Sarat, "is both a resource and a constraint.""
According to this perspective, rather than an external force impressing
itself upon social life, the law is an emergent feature of social relations and
a socially constructed system of action. Drawing upon reflexively
informed social theory, subjects, as products and producers of society,
emphasize the symbolic dimension of legal practices. From this point of
view, all practices-includinglegal practices-are analyzed in terms of
their degree of symbolic efficacy. The symbolic is seen here as something
that characterizes both the perception of reality as well as the practices
derived from it. This discursive or interpretive approach to the symbolic
contrasts with a descriptive or positivist stance, according to which there
is an external reality apart from the subject who knows it.
In what follows, I will concentrate on the latter two perspectives: that
is, on the critical idea that the symbolic is approached as an institutional
strategy-or as an institutional use-destined to serve the aims of
legitimation, and the epistemological idea--or that of constitutive social
theory-in which the symbolic is understood as a form of cultural
consciousness that constitutes and in turn is constituted by the society. I
will refer to them with the terms symbolic use of law and symbolic vision
of law, respectively. Clarity in the distinction between the two will aid in
comprehending the problems that derive from the extant theoretical model
in LCS.
IV. SYMBOLIC EFFECTS OF LAW INBOURDIEU AND IN THE LCS

Pierre Bourdieu is one of the most respected and most often cited
authors in the works of LCS. 0 His work is frequently referred to by

78. COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 23.
79. Austin Sarat"... The Law is All Over" Power,Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness
of the Welfare Poor,2 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 343, 377 (1990).
80. E.g., EWICK & SILBEY, COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 39 (when explaining their
theoretical framework they state: "[wje draw on a recent and growing body of literature in
sociology that attempts to bridge these dualisms by redefining the relationship between the
individual and social structure, reconfiguring what was understood to be an oppositional
relationship as one that is mutually defining." To that end, they cite first Bourdieu and then
Giddens, Swidler, Sewell, and Steinberg. In theoretical studies of sociology of law, Bourdieu is
frequently cited to justify a theoretical framework). Buchanan, supra note 28; see also McCann &
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sociolegal researchers affiliated with the LCS school as supportive of both
a constructive theory of practice of law and a symbolic understanding of
social relations. Those belonging to LCS are particularly attracted to his
idea that the keys to understanding how social structures are produced and
reproduced are found in concrete social practices. The practices constitute
the structures as much as the practices themselves are determined by the
structures; the structures are socially constructed in the practices of social
actors in their everyday lives. The concept habitus is of particular
importance in this effort to get beyond the subject/object dichotomy.
According to Bourdieu habitus is
a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures,
that is as principles which generate and organize practices
and representations that can be objectively adapted to their
outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or
an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to
attain them."
The empirical dimension of Bourdieu's postulate 2 and the relevance of
everyday practices fit well with LCS interests. One could even say that as
Bourdieu has the aim to write a general theory of practices, LCS is
attempting to write a general theory of legal practices. In both cases there
is an underlying question: how are the discourses and social practices
produced and reproduced?
Bourdieu's interest in this question is located in the fact that one can
obtain, through its elucidation, a better comprehension of political
domination in society. In other words, this question suggests another more
profound one: how is it possible that hierarchically based systems of
domination persist and reproduce themselves through social practices?
Bourdieu views society as a stratified and differentiated space in which
individuals struggle to defend positions and interests." Now, domination,
March, supra note 4, at 217; MERRY, supra note 6.
81. PIERRE BOURDmEu, THE LoGic oF PRACTICE 53 (1990). For an application of this concept
to the field of law, see Frederic Ocqueteau & Soubiran-Paillet, Champjuridique,juristeset rdgle
de droit: Une sociologie entre disqualificationetparadoxe,inDROIT ET SOCIeT 9, 9-26 (1996).
82. It is worth noting that in Bourdieu this does not lead to a positivist outlook on the social
sciences. Bourdieu considers erroneous the opposition of theory and practice or that of quantitative
and qualitative methods. Both "theoreticism," understood as speculation divorced from reality and

"methodologism" (methods as an end in themselves) have no reason to exist in sociology. See

generallyPierre Bourdieu & De San Martin, Lepatronat in ACTES DELA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE
(1978).
83. SWARTZ, supra note 37, at 63. According to Wacquant, PIERRE BOURDIEU & J. D.
WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 14 (1992), Bourdieu's work can be
interpreted as a materialist anthropology of the specific contributions of the different symbolic
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more than something linked to the use of physical violence, is something
articulated through, and experienced through, the use of symbolic
violence. The ones who are dominant in society do not achieve that
position merely through possession of economic capital. They also attain
cultural capital and the close connection between the two forms of
capital. 8 This articulation operates in such a way that the symbolic
systems-through which we establish classifications and determine the
essential categories of social inclusion and exclusion-do not have only
a cognitive and social structure function, 5 but also a political function of
domination. The symbolic is also an inherently violent practice to the
extent to which it imposes meaning on the world and on social relations in
which economic and political power lose their original arbitrary and
exclusive connotations and appear as something normal and acceptable.
Here Bourdieu's idea of "misrecognition" is important. Activities and
resources gain in symbolic power to the extent that they become separated
from underlying material interests and hence are "misrecognized"disguised as disinterested forms of activities and resources. The
application of this idea to law can be seen in Bourdieu's article Laforce
du droit.8 6 Not only is all action interested but much action can be carried
out successfully only if its interested character is "misrecognized."
The law is a good example of symbolic violence. The possibility that
legal workers have to establish essential classification for the social
order-legal/illegal, just/unjust, true/false--entails enormous political
privilege. According to Bourdieu, the official law is the privileged space
for the production and exercise of symbolic power. The law possesses the
"magic effect of nomination. 87 It also has the power to establish the
official, the legitimate, and the authorized worldview. Legal authority is
the privileged form of power, especially in terms of legitimate symbolic
violence-monopolized by the State-which the State both produces and
practices.8 8 The symbolic capital embedded in legal norms creates a type

violences on the reproduction and transformation of the structures of domination.
84. SWARTZ, supra note 37, at 136-37.
85. According to Bourdieu, the cognitive structures which social agents implement in their
practical knowledge of the social world are internalized "embodied" social structures. See generally
PIERRE BouRDIEu, LA DISTINCTION; CRITIQUE SOCIAL DU JUGEMENT (1979).

86. Pierre Bourdieu, La force du driot; elements pourune sociologiedu champjuridique,in
ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 64 (1986) [hereinafter La force du driot](French
version, perferred); Pierre Bourdieu, The Force ofLaw: Toward a Sociologyofthe JuridicalField,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 814-53 (1987) [hereinafter The Force of Law](English version). However,
I use here the original French version.
87. See sources cited supra note 86
88. Id. at 3. This idea of symbolic power is also usefully explored by BALANDIER, supra note
39; HARRY PROSS, ESTRUCTURA SIMBOUCA DEL PODER (1980); HARRY PROSS, VIOLENCIA SOCIAL
DELOS SIMBOLOS (1989).
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of force that functions independently of their implementation. 9 According
to Bourdieu, this type of legal force is defined by its opposition to both the
simple non-implementation (failure) of legal norms, and to the
implementation of legal norms through sanctions.9
In understanding the symbolic force of law or its legitimizing effect,
we must avoid not only those materialistic accounts that see nothing but
power relation in the explanation of law, but also those idealistic accounts
that explain it through the general recognition of the universal values
carried out by its norms. "We can no longer ask whether power comes
from above or from below," says Bourdieu, in a reference to the debate
between critical and doctrinal explanations of law. 9' Against the
materialistic account Bourdieu maintains that, "[w]e need to recover the
profound logic of juridical work in its most specific locus .... 92
However, this postulate does not prevent him from recognizing that,
"given the essential role it plays in social reproduction, the judicial field
has a smaller degree of autonomy than other fields, like the artistic or the
literary." 93
Symbolic power here is not only an institutional power but also a
power that is clearly linked to the economic structure of society. The
efficacy of symbolic capital in terms of social differentiation and hierarchy
relies on its correspondence with other forms of capital, among which
economic capital is primary. In Bourdieu's words, "[g]iven that symbolic
capital is none other than economic or cultural capital when it is known
and recognized according to the categories of perception that it itself
imposes, the relations of symbolic power tend to reproduce and to
reinforce the power relations that constitute the structure of social space."' '
For this reason the schema for perceiving the world are not simply systems
of knowledge, they also are systems of social domination that demonstrate
the importance of the objective division between social classes. 95 Loic
Wacquant explains how in Bourdieu "the sociology of knowledge or of
cultural forms is eo ipso a political sociology, that is a sociology of
symbolic power. ' ' 6

89. GARCUA-VLEGAS, supra note 39.
90. La force du droit, supra note 86, at 14.

91. Id. In the United States this debate was specially intense between CIS scholars and the
legal mainstream.
92. Laforce du droit, supra note 89, at 3-4.

93. id. at 18.
94. PIERRE BouRDIEu, CHOSES DrrEs 160 (1987).

95. Social class, according to Bourdieu, does not have an objective reality as Marx thought.
See BOURDIEU, supra note 37. What exists is "a space of differences, in which class exists, shall
we say, virtually... not as a datum but rather as something that is being invented" Id. at 28.
96. BouRDIEu & WACQUANT, supra note 83, at 14.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 55

In other words, the symbolic dimension of law is made of two
elements. One is the cognitive element, according to which actors give
meaning to their practices. The second, the political element, puts the
emphasis on the different types of uses of the symbolic in order to improve
domination. My argument is that this second aspect is neglected in LCS
and it is so because it is an aspect of the symbolic that seems to be relevant
only in a conception of society that draws upon a conflict theory, which is
strange to LCS.
LCS also take an interest in knowing how legal discourse and legal
practices are produced and reproduced over time.97 They conceive of the
law as a set of concrete practices of ordinary people and not as an
institutional discourse that is imposed upon them. The law is seen as a
complex repertoire of discursive strategies and symbolic parameters that
structure meaning and social practices. Thus, and in opposition to a
dogmatic view, the law is a phenomenon characterized by the pluralism,
indeterminacy, and contingency of legal practices. The symbolic is a
central element of this theory to the extent to which reality is constructed
through representations and interpretations and not in concrete realities.
However, in contrast to Bourdieu's work, here the emphasis is placed on
the cognitive aspect of the symbolic dimension of law. This explains the
importance attributed to legal culture, understood as a complex set of
discourses and symbolic frameworks through which individuals give
meaning to their legal performances.9" The cultural and constitutive
viewpoints can, at times, seem to be the same: "[t]his cultural or
constructivist understanding sees legality as an ongoing human
production."99
Structure is conceived of in terms of cultural schema that organize and
normalize social interactions. These cultural schema, unlike something
external and unitary that is imposed on subjects, are composed of myriad
complex interrelated significations that are difficult to disentangle."
Consciousness, argue Ewick and Silbey, is not an effect of structure but
rather an integral part of it. "[It] is participation in the production of
structures."'' Accordingly, ideology is not a set of abstract ideas but a
complex process through which "meaning is produced, challenged,
97. Silbey, supra note 36, at 41-42; Legal Consciousness,supra note 5, at 26; COMMON
PLACE, supranote 5, at 45, 247.
98. Critics consider LCS to be "[s]tudies of legal culture." Susan S. Silbey, Making a Place
for CulturalAnalyses ofLaw, 26 LAW& SOC. INQUIRY 39 (1992); MCCANN, supra note 16, at 15.
99. COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 31.
100. It is difficult to comprehend the meaning of a cultural order according to Clifford Geertz,
Ideology as a CulturalSystem, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 47, 56-57 (David E. Apter ed.,
1964). Cultural studies are marked by this skeptical position with respect to the possibilities of
understanding the structural elements that infringe on agency. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 235.
101. COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 224.
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reproduced, and transformed."' 2 Ideology, they argue, in a somewhat
confused way, can be understood to represent an intersection between
structure and consciousness. "If we use the term consciousness to name
participation in the production of structures, ideology refers to the
processes that produce a specific pattern in social structure."' 10 3 Whatever
the explanation, the concept of legal ideology is reduced to the level of
everyday legal practices as a complex process through which meanings are
produced, reproduced, and changed, beginning with the experience of
shared power.' ° Likewise, Harrington and Yngvesson, are opposed to a
modem conception of power grounded in "the distinction between
ideology and practice";' 0 such a conception places "ideology outside of
social relations, and thus creat[es] a two-dimensional world, one part of
which (culture, the symbolic, the state, law) is given and constitutes the
other."" The reconceptualization of these terms---culture, consciousness,
structure, ideology-supposes an erasure of their dividing lines; the
subsumption of structure in consciousness' 7 makes the difference between
culture, structure, consciousness, and ideology a very subtle one and
frequently confusing.'08
The "de-materializing" of the concept of ideology and its assimilation
to that of consciousness has even been the object of criticism in authors
sympathetic to the position argued in LCS. This is the case of Michael
McCann. For him "[t]he problem with this conceptual equation is that it
obscures, or reduces [the analytic] attention [paid] to... the interactive
relationship between [the] individual and [the] institutional" and between
the institutional and subjectivity.' 9 Once the institutional dimension of
ideology is played down, those social spaces where the poor live are
magnified. Not only is resistance overestimated in terms of political
practices but also those who suffer poverty are presumed virtuous or their

102.

MICHtLE BARRErr, WOMEN'S OPPRESSION TODAY: PROBLEMS IN MARXIST FEMINIST

ANALYSIS 47 (1980), cited in COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 225.
103. COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 225-26.

104. Id. at 225.
105. Harrington & Yngvesson, supra note 12, at 142.
106. Id.
107. COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 225 (stating that, "Structure, which in its conventional
formulation tends to be understood as largely material and external to the situations it constrains,
is now defined so as to encompass ideas as well as resources."). I admit with McCann, however,
that Merry's analysis, MERRY, supra note 6, of this relation is different to the extent that she
establishes a distinction between ideology and discourses.
108. See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 302-29, on the difficulties of formulating a cultural
theory. According to this scholar, following Geertz, the goal of cultural analysis is interpretation
and not theory. Id. at 328.
109. McCann & March, supra note 4, at 213.
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actions justified in all circumstances."' Their practices are presumed to be
violence free. But this is an illusion, as Bourdieu has explained: "[a]nd the
populist illusion which is nowadays nourished by a simplistic rhetoric of
'resistance' tends to conceal one of the most tragic effects of the condition
of the dominated-the inclination to violence that is engendered by early
and constant exposure to violence.""' Not only does this perspective not
help to distinguish the actions of the excluded according to their merits,
but in fact it works actively to obscure the way that powerful groups
routinely defy and resist legal norms, which frequently implies a
considerable cost for those with whom LCS authors identify. 1 2 Moreover,
the idea that the resistance holds is not related to social classes, race, or
workplace struggles, but rather to tactical maneuvers against judges,
clerks, mediators, administrators, or other state officials." 3 The fact that
both the collective and the contextual dimension of individual practices are
not considered leads these studies to conceptualize resistance as something
rather romantic and innocuous. In almost all the narratives chosen by these
authors, practices of resistance. 4 are reduced merely to intentions of
resistance that are supposed to be heroic but in fact are mostly useless or
ephemeral, even in terms of individual fights.
Symbolic power is exerted only with the collaboration of
those who undergo it because they help to construct it as
such. But nothing would be more dangerous than to stop short
at this observation (as idealist constructivism, in its
ethnomethodological or other forms, does). This submission
is in no way a "voluntary servitude" and this complicity is not
granted by a conscious, deliberate act; it is itself the effect of
a power, which is durably inscribed in the bodies of the
dominated, in the form of schemes of perception and
dispositions (to respect, admire, love, etc.), in other words,
beliefs which make one sensitive to certain public
manifestations, such as public representations of power.'

110. See id.
IlI. PIERRE BOURDIEU, PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS 233 (Richard Nice trans., Standford Univ.
Press 2000, 1997) [hereinafter PAScALIAN MEDITATIONS]. For an explanation of Bourdieu's
opposition against the celebration of resistance, struggles, and creative practices of the dominated,
see P. BOURDIEU & Loic J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (1992)
[hereinafter INVITATION TO REFLECTIVE SOCIOLOGY].
112. See PASCALIAN MEDIATIONS, supra note 11, at 219.
113. See generallyMcCann & March, supra note 4.
114. M. Becker, Towards a Substantive Feminism, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Cynthia
Grant Bowman & Morrison Torrey eds., 1995).
115. PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS, supra note 111, at 171.
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On reading the stories presented by LCS one gets the impression that,
despite their own interpretations of practices, the final obstacle actors face
in their fight for emancipation is a structural one: race, poverty, education,
and so on. It is striking that the authors overlook this element in their
analysis." 6 In the story of Millie Simpson told by Ewick and Silbey, for
instance, it is clear that she-a poor Black women-succeeds in her
resistance only when her boss, a powerful White man, decides to help
her. "7 If this is the case, why then are structural and institutional elements,
which undoubtedly are important for the understanding of legal reality and
legal culture, so disregarded? I claim that it is because culture, domination,
and hegemony are reduced to consciousness.
In Bourdieu, conversely, culture cannot be understood outside the
economic and cultural conditions in which subjects act. Cultural tastes are
never disinterested and can only be understood by starting from a theory
of symbolic power."' Culture is a set of dispositions internalized by
individuals through a process of socialization that constitute schemas of
perception and understanding of the world. These work only to the extent
that there is a certain correspondence with the hierarchical order that they
represent. "There is a correspondence between social structures and mental
structures, between the objective division of the social world-particulary
between dominators and the dominated in the different spaces-and the
principles of worldview and classification that agents apply to that
world.""' This correspondence fulfills essential political functions in
society. Thus, symbolic systems are not only tools of knowledge but, first
and foremost, instruments of domination. Cultural capital works the same
way as economic capital and of course is intimately related to it. All
cultural production is oriented to the production of dividends, that is, to a
reward.°2 0 According to Wacquant's reading of Bourdieu, the concepts of
habitus, capital,and space expand the scope of interests while reducing
that of utility and consciousness. The concept of legalconsciousnessin the
LCS does just the opposite.

116. Moreover, some LCS are aware of this fact. Sarat, for instance, insists that the welfare
poor do not have a counter hegemonic view of law; neither are they able to challenge the system
of legal meaning through which power is exercised and domination maintained. Off to Meet the
Wizard, supra note 6, at 377.
117. See COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 3-14.
118. SWARTZ, supranote 37, at 89 (interpreting Bourdieu, "[i]f his theory of practices extends
the idea of interest to culture, then his theory of symbolic power extends culture to the realm of
interest with the claim that all forms of power require legitimation.").
119. PERRE BOURDEtU, LA NOBLESSE D'1TAT: GRAND CORPS ET GRANDES tCOLES 7 (1989)
[hereinafter LA NOBLESSE E'ETAT]; BOURDIEU, supranote 49, at 206.
120. In Bourdieu's theory there is a search for profit analogous to the quest for economic
advantage in the selection or rejection of cultural styles. See BOURDIEU, supra note 37, at 147.
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"A central objective of Bourdieu's work is to show how cultural and
social class correlate."' 21 Ideology, for its part, is a tool that operates to
disguise social reality and therefore to maintain a certain status quo that
allows domination and differentiation among individuals. Ideology is then
synonymous with symbolic violence and consists in the capacity of a
social and institutional power to impose legitimate meanings, in such a
way that the power relations that undergird this power are hidden. 2' So the
law is an essential element of political domination and its nature is
domineering, potent, and almost inevitable.'23 In contrast, for LCS law is
always polyphonic, contingent, variable, and therefore, weak.'24
The studies of legal consciousness tend to neglect the postulate
according to which the different schema for perception, interpretation, and
action originate in the positions that social actors occupy in the economic
sphere. Ewick and Silbey, for example, differentiate three ideal types that
aid in the comprehension of this complex reality; they term them: "before
the law," "with the law," and "against the law."' 25 The first, "before the
law," reflects those practices that depend on a reified view of law,
understood to be a coherent, majestic institution with all the formal
trappings. 26 This is the view derived from the history it authorizes, the
story it wants to tell.' 27 The second possibility, "with the law," comprises
a vision of the law as a playing field on which different actors and
institutions compete.' The third, "against the law," encompasses those
attitudes that see the law as a space of confrontation and, at times,
emancipatory struggle." 9

121. SWARTZ, supra note 37, at 143.
122. Id. at 89. In Bourdieu ideology or symbolic violence is "the capacity to impose the means
for comprehending and adapting to the social world by representing economic and political power
in disguised, taken-for-granted forms." Id. In his PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS, however, Bourdieu
warns about the concept of ideology:
[i]f I have little by little come to shun the use of the word "ideology" this is not only
because of its polysemy and the resulting ambiguities. It is above all because, by evoking
the order of ideas, and of action by ideas and on ideas, it inclines one to forget one of the
most powerful mechanisms of the maintenance of the symbolic order, the twofold
naturalizationwhich results from the inscription of the social in things and in bodies.
PASCALIAN MEDIATIONS, supra note I ll.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Laforce du droit,supra note 86, at 64; BOURDIEU, supra note 94.
Off to Meet the Wizard, supra note 6, at 375.
COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 45.
Id. at 47.

127. Id.

128. Id. at48.
129. Id.at 48-49.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss1/5

24

Garcia-Villegas: Symbolic Power Without Symbolic Violence?
THE SIXTH ANNUAL LATCRIT CONFERENCE

This classification enriches the phenomenon of ordinary people's legal
representations and shows the complexity of the resistance to law that had
been oversimplified by some CLS. It does not appear, however, to give
sufficient weight to the power of certain material factors to restrict

pluralism, contingency, and legal practices. Ewick and Silbey, for
example, do not seem interested in investigating why some types of legal
consciousness appear to prevail over others and what relationship exists
between this tendency and the existence of a hierarchically divided
society. In the same Ewick and Silbey research, there is a clear correlation
between social marginality and the legal consciousness termed "before the
law"; likewise, to have some cultural and economic capital and the
representation of law as a game appear to go hand in hand. However this
correlation does not show up in their analysis, not even as an interesting
element. Because they are interested in what kind of legal consciousness
people possess without asking what kind of material conditions make this
legal consciousness possible, the concept of domination exists but does not
seem to hold a central place. 30
For these authors, social practices structure a social reality that, in turn,
affects these practices, but the process is not directed toward political
domination. Their interest lies in legal consciousness and individual
practices of resistance, as they form part of a process in which the meaning
given by individuals to their law becomes repeated and stabilized, and
those institutionalized structures become part of the meaning systems that
are employed by actors.' 3' But their narration of consciousness and
practices of resistance do not explain why, even in their own examples,
actors are not only inevitably isolated but also are unable, despite their
resistance, to modify their situation of subordination and marginality.' 32
This is so because they are not interested in exploring the conditions under
which an actor's legal consciousness is produced and reproduced in
society.' 33 Whatever the case, the act of limiting oneself to recounting
individual stories of resistance to hegemonic power, without taking into
consideration the obstacles to this resistance, obscures the phenomenon of
power in society, including that of local power to the extent to which it
exists in relation to other powers.'

130. PASCALIAN MEDIATIONS, supra note 1I1, at 67.
131. Legal Consciousness, supra note 5, at 741.

132. See White, supra note 6, at 21-32 (declaring that the narration of Mr. G's history leaves
the same impression).
133. PASCAL1AN MEDIATIONS, supra note I 11,at 68.
134. See generally BURAWOY ET AL., supra note 27; BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS,
TOWARD ANEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION

(1995).
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In the face of the crushing imposition of official law on individuals'
mental representations and on their practices, Ewick and Silbey speak of
"reification";' Bourdieu, in comparison, refers to symbolic violence.

These are not mere nuances of meaning; they presented and revealed two
different theoretical options, one centered in problems of knowledge and
the other in problems of power. In one, human agency is privileged, while
the other emphasizes the state's imposition of a worldview. Neither does
this refer simply to a question of emphasis; above all it is a difference
underlying three essential concepts in a critical legal theory: legal culture,
legal consciousness, and legal domination.
Both LCS and Bourdieu insistently employ an idea of the symbolic, in
opposition to an instrumentalist, view of law. For LCS, however, this
notion has an epistemological use that refers to the construction of a legal
reality premised on systems of communication and interchange among
individuals. 3 ' While in Bourdieu this idea has not only a constitutive
connotation (it creates the social world although this world first creates the
law), it has, first and foremost, a clear political presentation, because
creating and ordering social reality confers a permanence upon it that is
typical of things.'"3 In order not to fall into a sort of radical nominalism i
la Foucault, however, Bourdieu sustains that law's power to name and to
create "can function effectively only to the extent that the symbolic power
of legitimation (or naturalization) reproduces and heightens the immanent
historical power which the authority and the authorization of naming
reinforces or liberates.' 38 As a consequence, the political function of
symbolic legitimation is superimposed on a cognitive or merely creative
dimension that the law possesses as constructor of society. Law is seen as
an instrument strategically employed by social actors in conflict. 39
LCS, conversely, seem to give greater importance to the cultural or
constitutive dimension than to the political dimension, or at least they do
not center their attention on the latter. This weighting derives from the
assumption they adopt, in contrast to conflict theorists, that social actors
do not necessarily act in a strategic and self-interested manner. Bourdieu's
critique of phenomenological and ethnomethodological positions in
sociology is perfectly apropos here

135. COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 78-79.
136. In opposition to a conception of law as a set of normative institutionalized controls, see
generally Galanter, supra note 75, at 117-42.
137. La force du drot,supra note 86, at 13.
138. See id.; BOURDIEU, supra note 49, at 206; BOURDIEU, supra note 94, at 160.
139. According to Swartz, Bourdieu injects the language of strategy to distance himself from
strict structuralist forms of determination by stressing the importance of agency. SWARTz, supra
note 37. On the other hand, the concept of strategy does not lead to the acceptance of a rational
choice theory. Id. at 99.
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while they are right to recall, in opposition to the mechanist
vision, that social agents construct social reality, they fail to
address the question of the social construction of the
principles of construction of that reality which agents
implement in the individual and also collective work of
construction, and to consider the contribution of the State to
that construction ....In modem societies, the State makes a
decisive contribution towards the production and
reproduction of the instruments of construction of social
°
reality.04

LCS accept that violence is exercised through law and that this violence
favors hegemonic power; however, and in concordance with the cultural
turn prevailing in social theory over the last decade, it appears as if the
explanations lodge here and go no further. The relationship between
violence and class domination is not developed. For Yngvesson,' 4 ' the way
law names the world and the way legal professionals construct meanings
is hegemonic, but that hegemony assumes plurality: It does not passively
exist as a form of dominance. "It has continually to be renewed, recreated,
defended, and modified."' 42 Sarat explains this accent on resistance stating
that "[m]eanings that seem natural, or taken-for-granted, are described as
hegemonic, but because the construction of meaning through law is, in
fact, typically contested, scholars show the many ways in which resistance
occurs."' 43 I think that this approach does not take material constraints
seriously. In Stuart Hall's terms, "[it] replaces the inadequate notions of
ideologies ascribed in blocks to classes with an equally unsatisfactory
'discursive' notion which implies total free floatingness of all ideological
elements and discourses."'"4
Sympathetic to a discursive approach to social construction, Susan
Silbey maintains that the meanings and values held by social actors "are
never fixed, nor stable, nor unitary.' 45 Silbey recognizes, however, that
the possibilities of variation in these meanings and values are limited by

140.
141.
142.

PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS, supra note 11, at 174-75.
See generally Yngvessson, supra note 36
Id. at 1693.

143. Austin Sarat, Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
129, 140 (2000); see also MERRY, supra note 6.
144. Stuart Hall, The Problem of Ideology: Marxism Without Guarantees,inSTUART HALL:
CRrICAL DIALOGUES [N CULTURAL STUDIEs 25,41 (David Morley & Kuan-hsing Chen eds., 1996).
A similar critique of culturalist positions is found in Nancy Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of
Identity Politics:Redistribution,Recognition, andParticipation,in 19 THETANNER LECTURESON
HUMAN VALuES 22 (Grethe B. Paterson ed., 1998); see also BURAWOY ET AL., supra note 27.
145. Silbey, supra note 98, at 45.
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the specific circumstances in which each individual finds him or herself.'46
But is this sufficient? In LCS, the possibilities of social emancipation and
competition for the benefits of law appear as probable as the possibilities
of social domination. The concept of hegemony becomes malleable and
contingent. 4 The position of actors in social space, their economic and
cultural capital, is given short shrift while concentrating on the possibility
that actors oppose or resist power. This almost random account of the
values-consciousness-practice trilogy hides some characteristics that
frequently accompany hegemonic power, for example its persistence
through time, or its success in imposing legitimated social practices in
which stability and the absence of critique are characteristic features.
Concepts like domination and hegemony are frequently employed in LCS,
but they are used in a way that excludes both the ideas of class and the
State. The concept of hegemony seems to evoke the image of a dispute
among equals and of a fight for different meanings rather than the idea of
domination and violence. It is true that occasionally-as Yngvesson has
argued' 48-the exchange among actors is considered to be an unequal one;
however, it seems that this is only the starting point ofthe struggle and that
everything could change thereafter. In any case, it is difficult to state the
LCS view on this matter because there is only a resounding silence on the
question. There is a lack of interest in the elucidation of social
asymmetries even as a partial but important source of explanation of the
struggle among different meanings. The problem of power is reduced to
disembodied symbols as if the cultural dimension of power could be
explained by itself. This is why when they develop the idea of symbolic
power, they have in mind the idea of a symbolic power without symbolic
violence. Indeed, insofar as the social and economic location of the actors
in society is not considered, insofar as the socioeconomic hierarchy is not
examined, both domination and resistance are equally possible; I am
tempted to say they are "equally random."' 49 Every practice seems to be
reduced to a fight among actors holding different meanings, each of which
could eventually win. It seems as if there are no tendencies in this game,
no hierarchies, no violence. Even the State seems to be only one more
actor playing a game. Every practice is a matter of culture, a matter of

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at. 46.
Handler, supra note 26, at 700.
See Yngvesson, supra note 36, 98.
MERRY, supra note 6, at 8. See generally, Legal Consciousness,supra note 5. The fact

that people go to court, for instance, is considered as a fact of domination: "freedom from the
control of the community comes at the price of domination by the State, in the form of the court,"
says Sally Merry. MERRY, supra note 6. Given however, their lack of interest in class matters and
local positions of actors in society, they are not able to explain when and how this domination by
courts actually works.
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meaning. The difference between "high" and "low" is therefore erased.'
It is true that agency and meaning are restricted by structures, but these
structures are reduced to discourses and this analysis undermines the
question of why, in a given social reality, only some discourses are
possible.
In short, LCS are interested in people who are usually poor or
marginalized. However, this is an anthropological interest in symbols and
representations rather than a critical interest. Bourdieu is also interested in
social marginalization and domination. However, instead of focusing on
legal consciousness, he is interested in objective relations between people.
"I could twist Hegel's famous formula and say that the real is relational:
What exist in the social world are relations-not interactions between
agents or intesubjecteive [sic] ties between individuals, but objective
relations which exist 'independently of individual consciousness and
w ill' .... ,

The disinterest shown by LCS for macrostructural analysis obscures the
underlying factors that determine the relative permanence of social
hierarchy and domination; they give an image of openness, contingency,
mobility, malleability, and indeterminacy to social relations that in fact
does not exist in the United States or anywhere else. One does not have to
be against the dynamic and omnipresent notion of power in
Foucault M -as a critique of the conceptualization of the State as an
institution centralizing power and violence-to recognize that a healthy
chunk of the power in society circulates through state institutions.
It seems to me that domination takes on multiple forms, some of which
are efficacious precisely through an invisible or undetectable state. In
essence it is common for the State-and for law-to exercise its power
through selective doses of intervention or nonintervention in different
spaces and times. Or put another way, institutional power also consists of

150. See generally Yngvesson, supra note 36, at 1689.
15 1. INVITATION TO REFLECTIVE SOCIOLOGY, supra note I l, at 97.
152. A sort of fascination with the concept of power as developed by Foucault in le
panoptique, is found in LCS. See, e.g., COMMON PLACE, supra note 5, at 188; Legal
Consciousness, supranote 5, at 731; William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments ofPower
NegotiatingReality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions,77 CORNELL L. REv. 1447
(1992). This enchantment seems to be paradoxical to the extent that the opacity, the submission
even, of social actors to power structures is so characteristic of Foucault's thought. What happens
is, in North American sociology of law, Foucault's conception of power is very often taken up only
insofar as it is something fluid, variable, and decentralized, and not as it is shown to be an
omnipresent structure that determines social action. I question whether it is legitimate to dismember
Foucault's work in this fashion. See Buchanan, supra note 30 (including a more elaborate analysis

of Foucault).
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the selection of which social spaces to protect, which to abandon, which
3
to liberate, which to oppress, etc.1
V. CONCLUSION

The studies of legal consciousness have the merit of having
demonstrated the complexity and creativity of the legal phenomenon in
individual and collective spheres that, prior to these studies, were only
seen as passive elements of social regulation. It is doubtless that these
studies offer a more highly developed and complex view of the sociolegal
reality. A close reading, however, reveals the lack of critical energy that
some legal studies formerly possessed. A certain domestication of the
critical spirit has occurred, probably unintended, that wrests analytic
strength and interest from the studies of legal consciousness. To what is
this domestication due? More than a decade ago, Trubek and Esser
proposed that the attachment to empiricism was affecting the critical force
of these studies. Without ignoring the merits to their argument, in this
Essay I have attempted to answer this question by following a different
line of reasoning. My argument was organized as follows: first, as a
critique of the LCS idea of abandonment of both the institutional and the
macro-level perspectives in favor of ethnographic local studies; second, as
a postulate of inadequacy of the theoretical model that sustains the studies
undertaken within this micro-perspective.
Concerning the first point, LCS are nourished in the political
commitment of the Critical Theorists as well as the empirical aims of the
L&S founders. Nevertheless, they distance themselves both from CLS and
from the initial tendency of L&S (gap studies). With respect to the first
point, LCS reject the disregard for empirical research and knowledge of
the concrete sociolegal reality (law-in-action).The distance from the latter
is a condemnation of their lack of commitment to a position independent
of the dominant political thought and the circles of power. But the way in
which LCS achieved this double distancing continues to occasion
problems. The excessive emphasis placed on the constituted character of
the social world dilutes the distinction between the exterior and interior of
subjectivity in such a way that the critique loses its referent. Everything is
reduced to a scattered and random set of consciousnesses and social
practices that practically explain themselves tautologically.
A very high price to pay for the "institutionalist errors" of policy
studies: the absence of a macrosociological lens lessens the capacity to
"see" and analyze genuinely efficacious emancipatory options for the

153. Boaventura Santos, Bogotd: Uniandes, Siglo del Hombre, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIA DE LAS
JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA (200 1).
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excluded. The mental representation of reality leaves aside, or at least
underestimates, the ideological influence of state entities on individual
consciousness. In this fashion topics such as social action/agency, the
fragmentation of power, and individual resistance end up cloaking issues
such as class domination, hegemony, and alienation. The constructive
nature of social action is so strong that it overshadows its structured
dimension; in this way the macro-level of hegemony is hidden and the
classist connotation of symbolic violence is cancelled out.
In the second place, the study of consciousness and concrete legal
practices lacks a sufficiently clear theoretical framework. There seems to
be a certain incompatibility between a constructivist or interpretivist
theoretical model and empirical research. This disagreement could be
based on the fact that the former appears, at least at times, to be grounded
in social presuppositions close to those of the conflict tradition, while the
latter appears to be associated with a microinteractionist tradition that
gives the subject a central role in social organization. In the more specific
terms of this Essay, the problem occurs because the theoretical agreement
around the notion that the symbolic as an essential element in law hides
fundamental differences in the way that this idea is conceived and
employed by authors belonging to different sociological traditions. The
way that the LCS explain both the concept of "legal consciousness" and
the symbolic vision of law fits better in constructivist theoretical models,
particularly ethnomethodological theories, than in those developed by
Bourdieu, Giddens, or Touraine, where the symbolic is treated not only as
"symbolic vision," but also and especially-due to its affinity with conflict
theory-as "symbolic strategy" or "symbolic uses."
Symbolic force-Bourdieu says-that of a performative
utterance, and specially of an order, is a form of power which
is exercised in bodies, directly and as if by magic, without
any physical constraint; but the magic works only on the basis
of previously constituted dispositions, which it "triggers" like
springs. 154
Of course, a certain empathy exists between the explication of the
domestication of critique as an effect of empiricism, such as Trubek and
Esser argue, and this more general hypothesis of the lack of fit between
theoretical model and research. I think, however, that we do not argue the
same point and in fact the explanations are not even similar, one being
more particular and the other more general. My point is that empiricism in
L&S has a conservative character, not because the researchers are
conservative or because its use in the explication of reality prevents
154. La noblesse d'etat, supranote 118, at 169.
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investigators from adopting a critical stance, but rather due to the type of
empirical investigation prevailing there. This type of research-unlike
others' 55 -is linked to a theoretical tradition that concentrates on the
creative potential of social action in such a way that the connection
between agency and structure violates the spirit claimed by the
constructivist model.
To sum up, I think that this argument is explained less as an
epistemological problem of truth-objectivist versus interpretivist-than
as a problem of political presupposition in social theory. In the case of the
LCS this problem is manifested in a type of empirical investigation that
accentuates aspects related to agency, constructive capacities, and
resistance, at the expense of a social theory inclined to put the emphasis
on conflict, hierarchy, and structure. It is worth noticing that this
difference between conflict theory and constitutive theory exists despite
their agreement on the necessity to overcome the agency/structure
dichotomy or the objectivism/subjectivism dualism. In other words, I
claim that LCS have not succeeded in their purpose to overcome the
agency/structure dichotomy and that this is due to the fact that they do not
sufficiently consider the analysis of the social reality under which legal
consciousness is produced and reproduced in society, the analysis of, as
Bourdieu says, the "social construction of the principles of construction of
that reality" which is implemented in social practices.
The exigency of theoretical coherence in the model adopted, in very
vague terms to be sure, by the LCS, posits a dilemma. One possibility is
to uphold a constitutive theory of a culturalist stripe-which goes from
Clifford Geertz to Paul Kahn-according to which local actors in specific
discursive or symbolic social contexts in which plurality, contingency, and
indeterminacy engage in practices of social construction. In this case my
view is that all reference to authors such as Bourdieu, Giddens, or
Touraine should be abandoned. Another possibility is to take seriously the
structural aspect in social construction, which means taking on the
challenge of both 1) the tension between attempts at social change that
155. For example, those of Bourdieu. See also BOAVENTURA
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start from individual or collective action and the barriers, sometimes
insurmountable, that inhibit those emancipatory endeavors, and 2) the
tension between the micro-level of social action and the macro or
institutional level. I think that a critical vision of law, such as that
attempted in the studies of legal consciousness, 5 6 would have much more
chance to prosper on this micro/macro terrain.'57 In sociolegal terms, it
would be then a question of combining the symbolic vision of law,
inherent in all constitutive social theories, and which is not called into
question here, with a theory of the symbolic strategy as a political
instrument, whether it be of domination or of social emancipation. But
clearly this task will not be an easy one and still lies ahead.

156. See McCann & March, supra note 4, at 209.
157. A good example of the theoretical connection between micro and macro can be seen in
the concept of the "extended case method," developed by Michael Burawoy; such a method
"attempts to elaborate the effects of the 'macro' on the 'micro.' It requires that we specify sone
particular feature of the social situation that requires explanation by reference to particular forces
external to itself." BURAWOY ET AL., supra note 27, at 9; see also ADVANCES IN SOCIAL THEORY
AND METHODOLOGY, supra note 27. Concerning socio-legal studies, Santos develops a complex
macro/micro framework for the explanation of the role law plays in society as well as for
overcoming the dichotomy agency/structure. DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 134, at 275.
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